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Abstract 
"For the vast majority of consumers, the horror of getting a terribly expensive 
bill acts as a powerful deterrent to enter the Mobile Internet … Users expect the 
mobile web to be as open and easy to use as the fixed line'"- Commissioner 
Reding, Speech/08/70(2008) 
Mobile is a rapidly growing and potentially major element of the future Internet, and its 
environment cannot be sensibly considered in isolation from fixed networks [2]. A note on 
terminology: Europe uses the term Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) while the United 
States uses 'wireless' Internet Service Providers (ISPs) [3]. 'Wireless' is somewhat more 
open in the United States. In Europe, mobile has always made special pleading for forms 
of self-regulation, as we will see. The article introduces mobile broadband, then considers 
net neutrality in the fixed environment including the new laws passed in November 2009 
in the European Parliament, before considering the mobile net neutrality debate, the 
degree of price control regulation exerted on European mobiles and the MNOs' vigorous 
rear-guard anti-regulation defence. Finally, I look at the effects of this regulatory 
asymmetry and whether MNO calls for mobile to be treated differently from other ISPs can 
be justified. I conclude by examining what the effect of price and content control on 
mobile is likely to be for incentives for fixed ISPs and produce a result that I describe as 
the 'fixed' strategy.
1. Mobile Internet: Content and Control
Mobile services have been used to serve web pages to European users since 
approximately 2000, though the hype over early adoption disguised technical problems 
that have taken almost a decade to overcome [4]. The first generation of mobile Internet 
devices used Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) to deliver specially programmed, 
normally simplistic and graphic-poor pages over narrow-band networks, in Europe 
dominated by the standard Global System for Mobile (GSM). The screen is typically very 
small, and the pixilation (granularity) of the screen means that photographic images are 
cartoonlike. Text services (short messaging services or SMS) have developed as 160-
character text messages, rather than WAP-enabled chat or listserv. In fact, sending a text 
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in the twenty-first century is rather reminiscent of sending a telegraph message in the 
nineteenth century - and in terms of cost per bit, further reminiscent (a 160 character 
message costs up to 20 euro cents).
These 2G networks delivered data at about 65% of the speed of the modems used for 
fixed-line computers circa 1994/5. The simple 2G phone offered 64k colour screens, 
access at up to 27 kbps to '2.5G' networks and larger screen size. [5] The third generation 
- especially SmartPhones - and the data-card connected personal digital assistants and 
laptop computers are all enabled to receive web pages without re-coding for WAP. These 
are therefore the first portable Internet devices. Accessing the Internet over mobile 
networks at perhaps 1Mbps while stationary and outdoors, and with WiFi up to several 
Mbps, they can approximate the wired Internet use experience. With larger full-colour 
screens, they are fully specified Internet devices for image, sound and video. Note that in 
late 2008, only 13% of phones shipped to suppliers were SmartPhones, so 87% had 
inferior browsing experiences even if technically able to support 3G. [6] The surge of 
interest in the iPhone3G when launched in July 2008, followed by similar devices from 
Samsung, Nokia, HTC and others, means that in 2010 mobile Internet usage is taking off. 
Additionally, millions of European users- especially students and renters in their twenties 
who do not want a fixed phone line and long contract - use 3G mobile 'dongles' with their 
laptops as their main domestic Internet access. The mobile Internet is a new and rapidly 
growing market.
The first European commercial 3G broadband networks for mobile were those of Hutchison 
Whampoa's '3' service in the United Kingdom and Italy. [7] By end of 2004, most EU 
member territories had metropolitan broadband wireless services - by 3G and WiFi 
'hotspots'. Mobile phones could then be used to access the public Internet and download 
graphic files, sound and video clips. They can be used for adult services and premium 
services, such as the 3 'G's: girls, video gaming and gambling, however the 'walled 
garden' for users came with strong content filters that have restricted mobile operators' 
access to that revenue.
From the consumer's point of view, the main differences between generations of mobile 
technology are characterized by the different applications they facilitate, which can be 
summed up as follows:
 2G allows WAP and SMS applications; 
 2.5G allows multimedia messaging service including low-resolution video games; 
 3G allows rich media, streaming, full-motion high-resolution video. 
This means that the policies associated with material accessed via fixed Internet access 
might also be raised by mobile access to the Internet, with net neutrality, harmful content, 
spam, viruses and criminal use of networks all possible. Such technological advances have 
also led to the development of new business models for network operators, which focus 
largely on collecting revenue from online content. Generally, the provision of content is 
organized in three major approaches, which may be mixed:
1. 'walled garden' - the MNO creates a users' space for wholly controlled content and 
services, some of which may be bought in from third-party content providers; the 
'walls' around the 'garden' keep consumers tied to these offerings; 
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2. open access - any website or services over any mobile operator that allows Internet 
access and has a suitably fast mobile network for multimedia services; 
3. semi-open access or web-access approach - as in NTT DoCoMo's i-mode service. 
This is more open than a 'walled garden' and uses connection to any web-enabled 
site via its proprietary software, but has two tiers of accessible sites and business 
partners, where open Internet access is available but 'walled garden' content is 
accessed more easily. 
The different models have obvious implications for the power of the operator within the 
value chain, with the last offering full functionality and the ability to create a vertically 
integrated 'walled garden'. Other actors, such as device manufacturers or publishers, also 
can act to provide portal services and act as aggregators (e.g. Nokia's Club Nokia or 
Apple's App Store) [8].
The roll-out of European 3G networks has been slowed by overspending on licences, 
limiting the funds available for solving technical problems to bring a new and difficult 
technology to market. [9] Higher data rate services than these are available in some 
countries, notably South Korea and Japan, but Europe is still behind. The data rate - and 
its pricing, which goes with network capacity for high bandwidth - is essential in setting 
the expectations of customers and sales. The data rate sets not just the volume of sales 
but also the type of content that will sell. Simpler content with lower bandwidth demands 
such as ringtones and music have been the leaders. In Europe, 3G is being enhanced with 
next-generation (3.5G) enhancement HSDPA. [10] HSDPA became more widely available 
to the mass market in 2008-9.
One major trend concerning data rates which has delayed multimedia take-up is the price 
of data transfers over mobile, as measured against disposable income. Price has been 
used by MNOs as a way of limiting demand, to protect existing network capacity and delay 
faster high-capacity networks until existing networks have repaid their capital cost and 
returned profit (this is akin to telephone companies that resisted broadband in the mid-
1990s because they had invested in ISDN lines). Mobile data transfer costs for use of the 
network to download content or for streaming remain high, so users tend to minimize the 
amount of data transferred. Moreover, the markets targeted initially for much mobile 
content are teens and twenty-somethings, [11] with limited income, rather than business. 
This has acted as a major brake on content sales.
The development of mobile broadband has been much slower than anticipated since the 
3G auctions were conducted in summer 2000, with mobile broadband 'taking off' in the 
period since 2007. In June 2009, benchmarking tests by Epitiro showed UK broadband 
running at about 0.9 Mbps in evening peak time, a rate below that which would permit 
video streaming of the BBC iPlayer. The delays to the network also make it unreliable for 
video gaming or VOIP [12]:
"users received on average 24% of the maximum 'up to' headline speeds 
advertised.... During peak hours (6 pm to midnight) speeds dipped by 
approximately 20% ... web browsing which appeared to be 34% slower than on 
fixed ADSL connections. Ping times, an important metric for online game 
playing came in at around 150 ms which is too high for acceptable gaming 
performance."
3
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 1, Issue 2, 2010
Mobile is increasingly substituting for fixed Internet access for many consumers. Lewin, 
Williamson and Cave state that 'Competition between suppliers using fixed fibre access 
networks and those using mobile broadband networks for the spend of those at the 
margins' [13] will be a significant feature, with low-cost low-usage customers opting for 
mobile broadband - as 64% of Austrian consumers have done. This is despite Cisco's 
predictions that mobile broadband will account for 0.1-0.3% of total traffic as far as 2012. 
[14] This limited backhaul demand from fixed networks nevertheless means that they 
'expect mobile broadband to offer both a partial substitute for fixed broadband and a 
complement'. [15] That means it must claim to be a real Internet alternative, not simply a 
slow and clumsy supplement.
If mobile is replacing fixed connections, then consumers will expect to achieve comparable 
access to their favoured applications, as well as web browsing and email more generally. If 
mobile will not, or cannot, offer that comparability, the whole enterprise appears designed 
to persuade consumers to accept third-best. Television over the mobile device, or P2P file-
sharing more generally, will appear patchy at best if streamed over the mobile Internet 
connection, at least using current technologies and with current network quality and 
speed. There are of course technological and regulatory short cuts such as broadcasting 
TV over the Digital Video Broadcasting - Mobile (DVB-M) frequencies, which would mean a 
mobile device is both an Internet access terminal and a TV set. However, at face value, 
the current claim is that mobile Internet access can replace fixed for many consumers. If 
there are real and tangible differences that can never be bridged (or not until Long Term 
Evolution [LTE] is introduced over the next several years, having been deployed in Sweden 
and the USA in 2009-10) due to the technological, economic and social constraints of the 
mobile device, it would be helpful to make plain to consumers what the offer really is.
There is the same pair of problems with mobile as with the fixed Internet, though the 
problems are for mobile more profound. First, quite clearly speeds are too low and quality 
too inconsistent to enjoy all the benefits of Internet applications. Second, the value 
realized by users is too low currently to guarantee future investment in a fast open 
Internet as opposed to a walled garden of preferred content that can be offered at higher 
quality in return for greater returns to the network provider. Both these problems - speed 
and revenue - are compounded in the case of mobile by the number of networks. Where 
fixed has one or at best two networks to each consumer, mobile offers three, four, five or 
six (seven in the case of India), depending on national decisions on how many networks 
to licence. Even with some limited network sharing, it means that mobile networks are 
taking smaller slices of the mobile pie than fixed operators of their own. It looks like these 
sums simply will not add up - that the more successful operators might speed up their 
walled gardens while the less successful operators eke out a living with network sharing 
and very low data quality.
It is stating the obvious to note that any net neutrality ruling that did not affect wireless 
carriers would immediately create asymmetrical incentives that would divide the public 
Internet into mobile 'walled gardens' and fixed open Internet customers. That would most 
probably increase the mobile Internet's differentiation from fixed service (assuming 
technological changes at the same pace for both mobile and fixed). In such an 
asymmetrical world, there would be two classes of Internet access: the true Internet on 
fixed and the 'walled garden' plus whatever open Internet was permitted on mobile. That 
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is why the August 2010 news [16] that Google was joined with Verizon [17] in accepting 
that net neutrality should not apply to wireless in the USA led to a storm of protest that 
this meant no neutrality in the form of Internet access that is growing fastest, and on 
which Apple's iPhone policies and exclusivity on one network were already causing 
enormous controversy.
2. Net Neutrality: Definition and New European Laws
While issues about potential discrimination by ISPs have been current since at least 1999 
[18], the term 'network (net) neutrality' was coined by Tim Wu in 2003 [19]. In the period 
since, the debate was dismissed as 'a solution in search of a problem' or 'an American 
problem due to abandonment of network unbundling' by various interests close to 
incumbent ISPs. However, the increasing evidence that the maturation of technology and 
copyright business models meant that the Internet could become a full-definition video 
distribution mechanism meant that the 'problem' has continued to grow. Indeed, by 2006 
Charlie Dunstone of TalkTalk, one of the most innovative ISP owners and now second-
largest in the UK, told Ofcom's Annual Conference that he was receiving constant death 
threats from computer gamers whose connections his ISP was throttling explicitly in 
reaction to network capacity constraints [20]. Two years later, British Telecom, the former 
UK monopoly (whose unbundled lines TalkTalk retails) was throttling the BBC's iPlayer 
service regularly [21]. Network discrimination had arrived, if not net neutrality regulation.
The review of the European Electronic Communications Package had begun just before the 
"Dunstone death threats" were emerging, and in its initial explanation of its reasons to 
review the raft of 2002 Directives [22], the Commission noted the US debate but did no 
more than discuss the theoretical problem [23]. Over 2007-8, the volume of regulatory 
reform proposals in the USA, Japan, Canada and Norway had grown along with consumer 
outrage at ISP malpractice and misleading advertising, notably over notorious fixed and 
mobile advertisements (e.g. Vodafone for "unlimited 14.4Mbps broadband" in 2008) which 
presented theoretical laboratory maximum speeds on a dedicated connection with no-one 
else using it and subject to 'reasonable terms of usage' - which meant capacity constraints 
on a monthly basis, some of these on mobile as low as 100MB download totals (as I write, 
Hutchison 3 is advertising nationally its "massive 1GB monthly cap").
By May 2009, the European Parliament voted down the reforms at First Reading prior to 
parliamentary elections in June. This clearly signalled the need for compromise by 
Commission and Council of Ministers. Therefore, amendments on consumer transparency 
and network openness were offered to the Parliament in the Conciliation process, collected 
together by the European Commission in November 2009 in its 'Declaration on Net 
Neutrality' [24], appended to Directive 2009/140/EC:
"The Commission attaches high importance to preserving the open and neutral 
character of the Internet, taking full account of the will of the co-legislators now 
to enshrine net neutrality as a policy objective and regulatory 
principle to be promoted by national regulatory authorities (Article 8(4)
(g) Framework Directive), alongside the strengthening of related 
transparency requirements (Articles 20(1)(b) and 21(3)(c) and (d) of the 
Universal Service Directive) and the creation of safeguard powers for 
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national regulatory authorities to prevent the degradation of services and 
the hindering or slowing down of traffic over public networks(Article 22(3) of 
the Universal Service Directive)." (author's emphasis)
There in summary are the concerns about ISPs discriminating against content they dislike, 
or in favour of affiliated content. The new laws which become effective in Member States 
in May 2011 [25] states that Member States may take action to ensure particular content 
is not discriminated against directly (by blocking or slowing it), or indirectly (by speeding 
up services only for content affiliated with the ISP). The reality is that this declaration, 
helpful though it is in clarifying the legal situation, will rely heavily on the implementation 
at national level and proactive monitoring by the Commission itself. Nevertheless, it lays 
out the principle of openness and net neutrality. The Commission itself adds that it will 
introduce "a particular focus on how the 'net freedoms' of European citizens are being 
safeguarded in its annual Progress Report to the European Parliament and the Council" 
[26].
Member States largely opposed the declaration, and it was only appended as a sop to the 
European Parliament, which had taken up the consumerist and democratic cause of 
neutrality, much to the annoyance of the telecoms technical community and economists 
who insisted it was solving a problem which did not exist, and could not in the super-
competitive world of European telecoms (note Mme Reding's rebuttal of this false world 
view in the opening quotation). This has led to a flurry of consultation on the 
implementation of net neutrality. Ofcom's 'so-called net neutrality consultation' (it is 
unclear whether they doubt net neutrality or the need for consultation or both) closed on 
9 September 2010 [27]. The European Commission closed its consultation period 30 
September 2010 [28]. The club of national regulators, BEREC [29], met in Amsterdam 30 
September 2010 [30], in part to discuss their response to the European Commission on 
net neutrality. The FCC's comment period on their latest Notice was 1 October 2010 [31], 
specifically asking for answers to regulation of managed specialized services, and wireless 
net neutrality. It is this last point on which this article is concentrated, but as you will 
surmise from this flurry of autumn 2010 consultations, much is changing at great speed in 
the legal response to net neutrality.
3. USA: Wireless Carterfone?
The issue of wireless net neutrality has created more controversy in the United States, 
where interconnection charges between mobile and fixed are symmetrical and 3G wireless 
has rolled out more quickly in terms of data use. In particular, the launch of the iPhone by 
Apple created a sensation for data users, and became the must-have item of 2007. Its 
launch was controversial, first because it was not originally a 3G phone, second it did not 
incorporate WiFi and third it was tethered to a single network (AT&T Wireless), which has 
led to continued calls for the FCC's 'Four Freedoms' to be applied to wireless. [32] The 
market for 'cracked' iPhones anecdotally appears to have been enormous, with iPhones 
being exported to other countries prior to their introduction there. The tethered nature of 
the iPhone appears to have concentrated minds on the fact that the fixed ISP rules just 
don't apply to mobile: devices are blocked from networks, technologies are excluded, 
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content is filtered and overall the environment is a 'walled garden' not an open access 
platform. That inevitably causes significant policy issues to arise.
Tim Wu in 2007 issued a report on net neutrality for US wireless: 'to examine what carrier 
practices may be harmful for consumers or society.' The report makes four major 
recommendations:
1. 'Cellphone Carterfone' - The basic and highly successful Carterfone rules 
allowed any consumer to attach any safe device to his or her phone line 
through a standardized jack.
I note that this is in part a response to the tethering of devices using network rules that 
caused such a controversy with the Apple iPhone on AT&T's network. Soon thereafter, 
Google launched an Android open API phone on T-Mobile's network, which suggests that 
some kind of competition is occurring in the market without regulation. This is of course at 
the heart of the Microsoft competition litigation.
2. Basic Network Neutrality Rules - Wireless carriers should be subject to the 
same core network neutrality principles as fixed operators. Carriers can tier or 
meter pricing for bandwidth without blocking or degrading consumer choice.
3. Disclosure -In addition to the disclosure of areas lacking coverage and rate-
plan information, carriers should disclose fully, prominently and in plain English 
any limits placed on devices and bandwidth usage or if devices are locked to a 
single network.
Later, I will consider the solution to this transparency problem presented in the UK mobile 
broadband code.
4. Standardize Application Platforms - Wu suggests the industry should re-
evaluate its 'walled garden' approach to application development, and work 
together to create clear and unified standards for developers. [33]
This is where an open operating system such as Google's Android can change the nature 
of mobile development. Rich Miner of Google describes it as:
"A Linux-based mobile phone platform including an operating system, middleware, 
services and applications - everything you need to build a mobile phone. Open source 
software stack allowing extensive customization and commercialization; Mobile-centric 
design optimized for always-on, resource constrained embedded platforms; Rich and 
robust APIs to enable mobile mash-ups." [34]
Miner also described the 'walled garden' environment that has been the Internet 
experience: "this was the world we found: billions of mobile users and a mission to 
connect with them; tools for mobile development that were difficult to use; constrained 
devices; mobile browsers that delivered a poor experience; complex paths to get our 
applications to our users." These are undoubtedly the experiences of many users. He 
describes six drivers of a change, a change fostered by the Open Handset Alliance which 
Google helped to organize:
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• Device innovations are reducing hardware constraints 
• 3G is now delivering always on wireless broadband 
• Phones have browsers with desktop level capabilities 
• People who know software are driving the platforms 
• Developers can get mobile apps directly to consumers 
• Controlled stacks being replaced by long-tail content. 
Google's interest in net neutrality on wireless is not new. As a result of concerted lobbying 
of the FCC by Google, corporate actors with similar open access strategies and public 
interest groups, the FCC in 2008 introduced special open access rules for the released 
broadcast 700MHz spectrum. [35] Prior to the auction, Verizon had charged that offering 
open access conditions would reduce the price of the spectrum to any private bidder that 
won, and that this interference was both unjustified and unconstitutional. [36] However, it 
tactically withdrew its case prior to winning the auction with a price only 3% above 
Google's reserve price for the spectrum ($4.74b to $4.6b). It remains to be seen whether 
the commitments secured from the auction winner, Verizon, will prove to be another AOL-
style 'Kingsbury commitment' - or a one-off sop to net neutrality advocates that is rapidly 
forgotten as the industry attempts to erect further walled garden barriers.
Problems with 'walled garden' mobile are not confined to Europe and the United States. 
Michael Geist provides an excellent analysis of the ongoing accusations from content 
owner The Weather Network (you need good forecasts in Canada, and that is its content!) 
against wireless carriers blocking content. The basic problem is that content sites that do 
not make a 'walled garden' deal with the wireless carrier find their web pages 'rendered' 
into a different format by the carrier, with different advertisements substituted. This is a 
whole different level of discrimination than fixed ISPs are known to have engaged in. They 
claim:
1. Wireless resellers blocking advertisements from a mobile site 
2. Wireless carriers stripping out tracking codes embedded in web pages, thereby 
limiting ability to deliver advertisements 
3. Wireless carriers establishing 'walled gardens' that provide preferential access that 
reduces data charges for sites within the walled garden 
4. Forcing users through the wireless carrier homepage when accessing the Internet 
on feature phones 
5. Prior approval of applications for use on smart phones 
6. Extra fees for text messages that include ads 
7. Wireless carriers limiting to whom ads in text messages may be sold [37] 
It appears surprising, therefore, that mobile operators claim everything in the garden is 
rosy, that their new 3G 'dongles' (plug-in USB connected wireless modems) can offer a 
genuine substitute for fixed-line access, and that speeds can be 'up to 14.4 Mbps', which 
would be genuinely as fast as the theoretical maximums of fixed access. The cap on 
monthly usage would not suggest quite the confidence that mobile networks claim, with 3 
GB or 5 GB quite common high-usage caps, and 1 GB even more frequent for the casual 
user, based on current advertised rates in the United Kingdom. [38]
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4. UK Marketing Code of Conduct
The slow speed and unreliability of mobile broadband led Ofcom to pursue with the 
mobiles a formally self-regulatory scheme to prevent misleading consumer advertising and 
marketing of their limited broadband offer. The European Commission noted that the 
existing fixed ISP Code was not used [39]:
"[In] July [2008] Ofcom published a new voluntary code on broadband speeds. Some 43 
ISPs, covering over 90% of broadband customers, had signed up to it by December 
2008 ... This Code, however, applies only to fixed broadband and not to mobile 
broadband, where QoS issues are also highly relevant in particular because of the 
instability of transmission speeds depending on traffic."
On 1 June 2009, Ofcom released the Mobile Code of Conduct, including information on 
coverage, as well as the factors that impact download speeds, and pricing [40]. In a 
section marked 'Monitoring' - somewhat incongruously for self-regulation but in line with 
its fixed ISP co-regulation 'lite' announced in 2008 - it states:
"Ofcom has been fully consulted throughout the process and our Director of Consumer 
Policy, Claudio Pollack, said: 'Ofcom welcomes the mobile operators' commitment to give 
their customers better information about mobile broadband services. We will be 
undertaking further research and monitoring of mobile broadband to check that 
consumers' needs are being met."
This suggests MNOs are on notice to improve their service and make their customer 
advertising more truthful and less misleading. The Code of Conduct itself is remarkable for 
its brevity. It states [41]:
'Principles of Good Practice for selling and promoting Mobile Broadband
...The principles cover:
• Coverage 
• Factors that determine download speeds 
• Pricing Transparency 
Coverage 
1. Make coverage information available via a web site (e.g. a map or a post 
code checker).
Promotion of factors that determine download speeds 
2. Download and upload speeds that are given in advertising and promotional 
material must be achievable by end-users and should be accompanied by an 
explanation that speeds are variable. An indicative range of download and 
upload speeds under normal conditions can be given.
3. The factors that determine download speeds should be explained (e.g. 
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distance from mast, surrounding environment, number of other users, network 
connection).
4. A glossary should be made available describing technical mobile broadband 
terms used in customer literature and on on-screen indicators (e.g. 3G, 
HSDPA).
5. Translate raw data speeds into some real life examples such as: 2 Megabits 
per second delivers a 5 minute music track in approximately 20 seconds.
Pricing transparency
6. Pricing information should set out the relevant tariff options, including a 
description of any fair usage limits. There must an explanation of the 
consequences of the usage limit or fair usage allowance being exceeded.
7. Where operators make references to Megabits, Megabytes and Gigabytes in 
close proximity, they should give an explanation of the differences. A 
description of what, for example, a Megabyte of data usage allows should be 
provided.
8. Pricing information should include either the roaming charges or a hyperlink 
to where the roaming charges are set out (which should also set out 
explanations of what a Mb of usage allows description of fair usage limits and 
any other relevant information).'
Given that the entire Code is only 365 words, it is presumably a first draft, and details can 
be added with more 'close consultation' with Ofcom. For instance, there is no mention of 
upload speeds or of peak congestion (except that allusion to 'number of other users'), 
which is a huge issue with mobile, as the EC pointed out.
This is thus far the extent of regulation of mobile broadband, and it is a very sparse self-
regulatory scheme. The regulation of mobiles in this way is not a surprise to many who 
have seen the mobile sector declared Europe's telecoms success story in the past two 
decades. Given the intransigence of fixed-line incumbents to competition through the 
1990s, it is perhaps understandable that the member states saw mobile oligopoly as a 
success story, with rapidly increasing penetration and falling prices. Viewed with hindsight, 
we can see that social network use of cellular mobile technology was the driver rather 
than particular European MNO innovation: mobile is a global success story, with vast 
oligopoly profits and high charges in most countries. It was once said that commercial 
television was 'a licence to print money': self-regulated MNOs appeared to be the new way 
to make billions. In the next section, we will see that mobile termination monopolies 
permitted exponentially higher charges to fixed operators than they could charge back to 
mobiles, the European mobile subsidy that drained much of the profitability out of fixed 
phone companies.
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5. Mobile Call Termination and the Fixed Subsidy to Mobile
A mobile termination monopoly endures in telecoms, in that you can only call me by 
routing that call through my mobile network. Mobiles have been able for many years to 
maintain very high termination prices even under regulation (and especially where not), in 
contrast to regulated fixed prices. MNOs in Europe have limited competition, with between 
three and five networks in major markets. The costs of terminating calls on mobile 
networks, previously unregulated, have recently been examined and regulated particularly 
vigorously in the United Kingdom, even though regulated termination costs are now lower 
elsewhere. [42] The European Commission states:
"Mobile termination rates are also typically 10 times higher than fixed termination rates …
[this] cannot be justified by differences in underlying costs, networks or national 
characteristics. They are an indirect subsidy that benefits mobile operators with a large 
market share to the detriment of smaller and fixed-line operators. They also direct funds 
away from critical investments like upgrades to high-speed internet networks, and hinder 
innovative services like converged fixed-mobile products and competitively-priced bundles 
of calls." [43]
These termination charges represent a hidden subsidy paid by fixed ISPs to their mobile 
cousins. Small operators of mobile networks have called for the full abolishment of 
termination charges, because high terminating rates mean largest companies benefit 
most. Hutchison 3 has no 2G termination monopoly to exploit with its network, in fact it 
rents its 2G network and operates as a virtual MNO, making margins only on its 3G 
network termination. Hutchison 3 is the 'rogue' operator amongst the UK mobiles, because 
it is lobbying to remove the termination charges it pays its incumbent 2G rivals (T-Mobile 
which merged with France Telecom's Orange [44], Telefonica's O2, and Vodafone). Its UK 
Chief Executive Kevin Russell launched a 'Terminate the Rate' campaign with BT on 20 May 
2009, stating that:
"The amount of legal authority and PR mobilized by the Big Four is unbelievable … We get 
subsidised by BT but we want the subsidy to go." [45]
The reason is that 3 customers call the bigger networks much more than their customers 
call it, so 3 pays more in termination at the above-cost charges the 'Big Four' are 
permitted (note that Orange and T-Mobile merged in summer 2010, creating a 'Big 
Three').
The effect of compulsory subsidy by European fixed-line customers of their mobile friends, 
through termination rates ten times above fixed-to-fixed rates, is to increase mobile 
penetration above cost-oriented levels, such that people who would have chosen to make 
no call or a fixed-line call, instead used a mobile to either receive a call or send a text: the 
very cost-conscious have a mobile phone whereas in 'bill and keep' countries they may 
not. Think of it as a form of unexpected universal service for the poor. The model 
encourages prepaid as well as monthly subscriptions, so that twice as many UK customers 
have prepaid SIMs as monthly contracts, though this is highly variable by country, so that 
France has twice as many monthly contractees as prepaid customers. The more prepaid 
customers, the lower the monthly minutes used (i.e. lower actual phone utility). [46] 
Astonishingly, the European average is about 1 minute for every 3 minutes used in the 
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United States.
In the United States, where termination rates are the same as fixed-line rates (which 
means networks effectively 'bill and keep' - peer to swap traffic), average minutes per 
month are 700-800, and subscriber penetration is 84%, though note that Canada with a 
less competitive market for mobile has much lower penetration and usage (62% and 430 
minutes). [47] It may be that penetration growth in 'bill and keep' countries has been 
slower than in calling party pays (CPP) systems, though figures are obscured by the 
propensity of more price-sensitive customers in CPP systems to buy multiple SIMs for 
different networks, such that penetration exceeds 100% by significant levels (otherwise 
explicable only by many people having own-use and office-use mobile phones, itself a 
measure of unexpected honesty or insecurity in job tenure). [48] However, overall the 
statistics appear to indicate that prices lowered faster and earlier in the United States than 
Europe, by 75% in 1996-2001, hence that very high usage rate, and that penetration 
achieved saturation slightly slower. Summarizing the US experience as compared with 
Europe, I draw the following six conclusions:
 Fixed networks have not subsidized mobile, as the 'bill-and-keep' interconnection 
regulation has ensured parity; 
 Mobile penetration levels are almost identical at a saturation 82%; 
 Mobile usage per customer is three times higher than in Europe; 
 Networks offer continental coverage at identical prices, while in Europe, the 
hypothetical Euro-traveller would pay 26 countries' roaming charges while doing 
business in the Internal Market; 
 Universal service is maintained by coverage requirements on licences, [49] and 
spectrum licences remain sufficiently attractive that the open access 700 MHz D 
Block auction was successfully concluded, though critics claim that it failed to 
achieve openness via a new market entrant or to garner maximum price for 
spectrum [50]; 
 The lack of a special pleading regime for economic pricing of mobile termination has 
contributed to an inclusive discussion of net neutrality for mobile in the United 
States, in contrast to that in Europe. 
In the EU the average mobile termination rate is 8.7 euro cent (and as high as 15.09 cent 
in Bulgaria). [51] India's telecoms regulator, TRAI, in March 2009 announced a slashing of 
the mobile termination rates by a third - from 0.3 rupees per minute to 0.2 rupees per 
minute on local calls, effective April 2009. That is 0.32 euro cent per minute (or 2% of 
what the Bulgarians pay). Mobile monthly usage in India has increased in 2003-8 from 326 
minutes to 464 minutes, almost twice EU levels. Commissioner Reding stated [52]:
"High mobile termination rates are thus an indirect subsidy for the larger mobile 
operators - a subsidy that has to be paid by all fixed operators, by smaller 
mobile operators and by all consumers. While there may have been a greater 
tolerance of high mobile termination rates when mobile networks were first 
being rolled out across Europe, they can no longer be justified today, at this 
advanced stage of mobile market development."
This explains why US users make much larger volumes of calls, and mobile companies 
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who cannot charge higher termination to fixed operators are therefore not paid the 
European 'mobile subsidy'. Mobile companies have fought a very long running battle to 
maintain their high prices, in the case of the United Kingdom for instance it is now over a 
decade old, but this EC activity indicates that this regulatory episode is drawing to a close. 
This led the EC to issue an Article 7 Recommendation on mobile termination rates 
following consultation, under its responsibilities to coordinate a single market for 
communications within the terms of the Framework Directive. [53] The issuing of a 
recommendation requires NRAs to take 'utmost account' of EC recommendations, in 
conjunction with the requirements to ensure accurate cost accounting for wholesale and 
retail markets. In this case the Recommendation requires that 'NRAs should ensure that 
termination rates are implemented at a cost-efficient, symmetric level by 31 December 
2012' (para 12). [54]
Note again the Commission's argument on the first page of this article: high mobile voice 
termination rates direct funds away from critical investments in fixed fibre access.
6. Regulatory Symmetry and the 'Fixed Strategy'
In mobile markets, the 'dongle' has led to a surge of substitution of fixed broadband by 
mobile, as well as new broadband users, with over 100 million 3G broadband users (both 
'dongles' and phones). Will mobile broadband users be allowed to exploit their dongles to 
use the Internet openly as they can on their fixed ISP? The Economist stated:
"The growth, however, comes with a couple of big drawbacks for the operators. 
One is loss of control. Subscribers can do what they want: the operator is 
merely a 'dumb pipe' to the internet. Next, rates have been falling quickly ... 
'Network neutrality', the principle that operators should not discriminate 
between different forms of traffic, will not succeed on mobile networks, says 
Holger Knöpke of T-Mobile." [55]
The argument that there are sufficient networks to compete away such a hopeless (from 
the universal open viewpoint) scenario is based on the success of open wireless platforms 
offered in particular by the 3G entrants in Europe. While most 3G licensees are extending 
their 2G networks, we saw that Hutchison 3 began 3G service earlier, and has a more 
open service, than its rivals, marketing itself as offering Internet service at cheap rates via 
its 'dongle' and also Skype-to-Skype calls for free on its phone network. [56] I argue that 
3 is the exception that proves the rule, as indeed does the United Kingdom. The UK fixed 
incumbent, BT, sold its mobile network to Telefonica in 2002, under pressure to reduce its 
debts. As a result, there is not only separation in the United Kingdom between wholesale 
and retail arms of the incumbent, but between the fixed and mobile incumbents, leading 
to a much more even regulatory and lobbying battle, even if Russell expresses amazement 
at the 'Big Four' and their legal expenses. Elsewhere in Europe, for instance in the homes 
of T-Mobile (Germany), Telefonica (Spain) and France Telecom, there is resoundingly less 
pressure to regulate the termination monopoly of the mobiles. The renegade 3 may put 
pressure on regulators in the markets it has entered (including Italy), but without an 
incumbent to make much bigger noises, all it does is show that in very specific, almost 
freakish, conditions, as in the United Kingdom, there is a real choice of 'walled garden' or 
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open access. More importantly that open access is at a price and coverage that makes it 
somewhat attractive to low-volume transient users.
The special pleading of mobiles, and the relaxed or incompetent regulation of their 
termination rates (depending on your viewpoint), is greatly to the detriment of consumers 
with fixed-line connections. The approximate number €100 billion keeps coming up:
1. It is the minimum number in what ECTA claims has been the cross-subsidy effect of 
distorted fixed-to-mobile termination rates over the past decade; 
2. it is what the mobiles 'lost' on the 3G auction due to its timing at the height of the 
dot-com bubble (the total cost in Europe was substantially higher but the spectrum 
was never going to be given away); 
3. it would make an enormous hole in the cost of getting every European household 
onto at least 50 Mbps VDSL broadband lines - even if the backhaul would still be a 
bottleneck. [57] 
Should these three numbers be related? The regulatory purists would say no, the realists 
would say of course they are. The European broadband environment has been enormously 
distorted by these problems for the past decade, and arguably its one reason why 
competitive broadband has been patchy at best. The answer to that is to stop deceptive 
advertising and enforce net neutrality standards on ISPs including mobile, while Ofcom is 
still trying to avoid including mobiles in its preferred co-regulation. My position is rather 
more interventionist than most, based on a lack of belief that NRAs are effective at 
ensuring that consumers are well informed and competition works effectively, and 
therefore that minimum quality requirements should be necessary. Consumers are 
misinformed and misled by most ISPs, and competition works ineffectively in general. Of 
course many NRAs may ignore net neutrality requirements, and the Commission should be 
careful what it asks for and enforces in the new regulatory package. Therefore, I see a 
need to fire a legislative shot across the bows of all ISPs to ensure they conform to 
minimum 'net neutrality lite'. [58] If customers get what they pay for, they might be 
happier with ISPs.
This leads to some lateral thinking and what I term the 'fixed strategy' - a regulatory 
option for redressing the balance in the fixed-mobile debate while ensuring at least 'net 
neutrality lite'. How can ISPs make money on their fibre investments if they continue to 
over-promise and under-perform? Four options present themselves:
1. PHORM-type behavioural advertising, act as targeted advertisers and extract 
some of Google's revenue without directly charging them [59].
2. The 'Mobile' option: Discriminate and offer consumers walled gardens of 
'approved' (i.e. prioritized) content - exclusive offers where possible, such as 
with Disney Channel, or the football FA Premier League.
3. Stop spending money on network intelligence and offer customers what they 
want, high-class Quality of Service without rationing.
4. The 'Fixed strategy'.
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The United Kingdom is unique: an incumbent SMP operator, BT, which has no mobile (as 
opposed to wireless) network, has the Openreach structural solution. It also has a 
reasonably strong tradition of regulating mobile networks, over a twenty-year siege laid by 
the most expensive lawyers in London. Yet still the Competition Commission castigated 
Ofcom's latest attempts to regulate mobile termination. [60] So the 'Fixed' plan to invest in 
higher bandwidth without the need for behavioural advertising, QoS deployment or 'walled 
garden' portals is:
 Reduce mobile prices to cost - check Indian termination rates for cost; 
 Fixed operators stop losing market share and interconnection charges 
 They can invest in higher speed broadband as their advantage over mobile; 
 Enforce net neutrality against mobiles too - if mobile broadband is the advertised 
14.4 Mbps, they can give their customers the whole Internet. 
What does this radical option do? It enforces a transparent cost-based technology-neutral 
settlement on the operators, and thus a transparent and open access solution for 
consumers. Will Ofcom and the European Commission do it?
7.Conclusion: Little prospect for mobile net neutrality in 
Europe
As regulation stands, mobile will be a walled garden for the most part, and fixed ISPs will 
either move towards that walled garden (reversing the historic strategy of AOL) or a gulf 
will open between the two types of access. European mobile is likely to offer a safer and 
more sanitized experience though with less surprises and innovation. US observers may 
think that European 'lite' net neutrality is a long way backwards from their debates, but it 
is also a long way forwards from the current situation in most EU countries for fixed ISP 
access, and for mobile.
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